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University of New Hampshire, December 2008 
Considerable research in political science has been done concerning democracy 
and the effects of oil rent. Prevailing literature suggests that dependence on oil and rentier 
behavior by states can heighten the dependence of social groups on the state through 
political and economic effects. Yet in the case of Kuwait, we find that oil rent has helped 
build human capital, institutional capacity, and autonomy for social groups. This 
autonomy allows social groups to better bargain with the state and advance 
democratization. This will be contrasted to the case of Morocco, where social groups 
remain dependent on the state despite cycles of liberalization and influence over state 
policy. This study will reveal that oil rent can have positive effects on the agency of 
certain social groups in Kuwait. 
1 
Chapter 1 
AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCY OF SOCIAL GROUPS 
Oil Rent and Social Groups 
In authoritarian regions of the world that were not part of the "third wave of 
democratization"1, there is significant literature explaining why social groups have not 
gained political agency or been able to push for democratization. Agency will be defined in 
this study as the ability to dictate legislative policy on an authoritarian state through elections 
or through legislation in parliament. Democratization will be defined as a push for free and 
fair elections, more inclusion by social groups in parliament, and having a parliament that 
can push for reforms without the acquiescence of the sovereign. Democratization does not 
mean establishing a constitutional government with equally divided power. It merely refers 
to making progress toward characteristics of an established democracy; fair elections, a 
parliament with legislative power, and inclusion of most citizens in the political process. 
In the Middle East, state structure, the role of Islam, regional conflicts, and the impact 
of oil rent have all been cited as factors explaining a lack of agency. Oil rent is the revenue 
gained from the sale of oil that is seen as unearned or not the product of someone's labor. 
This study investigates under what conditions social forces in Kuwait become autonomous 
from the state and act as agents for democratization. Autonomy will be defined as having a 
formalized organization to represent a certain social group that is funded and led by members 
1
 The Third Wave of Democratization is a term coined by Samuel P. Huntington to describe the global trend 
that has seen more than 60 countries experience democratic transitions since 1974. 
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of that social group independent of government influence or co-optation. The Kuwaiti case 
will be examined comparatively with the case of Morocco which should have a more 
advanced transition to democracy (i.e. stronger parliament, free and fair elections) because it 
is void of oil or other external rent to keep social groups dependent, has an active party 
system, and an opening market. "In several formal respects, the Moroccan experience 
appears a good deal more advanced than those in Jordan and Kuwait" (Herb, 2005, p. 180). 
This study will show that the autonomy and agency of Kuwaiti social groups are more 
pronounced, with oil rent being a major independent variable. 
The rentier framework suggests that oil rent is used to placate social forces that may 
be in opposition to the state. These structural arguments are based mainly on observations 
made following the 1960s and 1970s. Structural arguments may no longer be sufficient to 
explain all rentier states. Recent literature suggests a new phase in the rentier saga is 
underway, and that certain social groups may become politically salient due to the 
distribution of oil rent (Luciani 2005, Moore 2004, and Tetreault 2000). 
Oil rent can help build the autonomy of certain social groups which may allows them 
to mobilize in support of more influence over state policy, a stronger parliament, a more 
transparent and accountable state, and greater democratization. In certain cases oil rent helps 
to build certain kinds of human and institutional capital. This capital can lead to greater 
autonomy. Human capital is services like healthcare and compulsory education that improve 
the conditions of a person's physical or mental well being. Job training would also be 
considered human capital. Institutional capital refers to an organization created by social 
groups to better lobby for or protect their interests. Thus an Islamist association that pushes 
the government for instatement of Sharia law would be considered institutional capacity. 
3 
This study will extend the timeline of oil literature. This study will also consider the 
historical and social context of Kuwaiti social groups. Historical and social context must be 
integrated into analyses of contemporary rentier states. Social groups and cultural identities 
that existed before the discovery of oil must be considered. Life for these rentier states did 
not begin in 1973 (Okruhlik, 1999, p. 309). This analysis combines the distribution of oil rent 
with the historical and social context of Kuwait. Rentier state theories should provide 
linkages among 1) political choice, 2) state strategies, and 3) consequences for particular 
social groups. Social groups can be important carriers of democratic ideas and values and can 
operate independently of the state given the right conditions. This study will demonstrate that 
social groups in Kuwait are not dependent on the state in the manner the rentier framework 
suggests. This can be seen when social formation in Kuwait is contrasted with the case of 
Morocco that arguably should have a more advanced transition to democracy. 
The theoretical framework for the study is as follows: certain social groups in Kuwait 
exist independent of oil rent and are mobilized as a result of the distribution of that rent. 
These social groups have developed institutional capacities autonomous from the state. 
Furthermore, this autonomy makes these social groups more likely to see democratization as 
being in their interests. Agency is gained by turning rentierism into human and other capital, 
then independent institutional capacity, which in turn helps social groups mobilize against an 
authoritarian state and toward democratization. Not every social group mentioned in this 
study fits this framework perfectly, especially in the case of women. Together, these social 
groups demonstrate that the rentier framework does not account for their autonomy. 
4 
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Whether these groups have or can help a state achieve true democracy is not 
considered here; rather, the discussion centers on whether or not autonomy from the state 
leads these groups to push for democratization as supporting other interests (profits, political 
inclusion, cultural autonomy, etc). 
Charles Ragin's (1987) study of the comparative method suggests that a case-oriented 
method is applicable to understanding the historical and social context of social forces in 
Kuwait and Morocco. 
The goal of case-oriented investigations often is both historically interpretive and causally 
analytic. Interpretive work attempts to account for significant historical outcomes or sets of 
comparable outcomes or processes by piecing evidence together in a manner sensitive to 
historical chronology and offering limited historical generalizations which are sensitive to 
context. Thus comparativists who use case-oriented strategies often want to understand or 
interpret specific cases because of their intrinsic value. Most, but not all, case-oriented work 
is also causal analytic. This companion goal is to produce limited generalizations concerning 
the causes of theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomenon (such as the 
emergence of class-based political parties) common to a set of cases (Ragin, 1987, p. 35). 
The comparative method has been used in many seminal works that investigate state 
formation and democratization; including Immanuel Wallerstein's Modern World System I, 
Perry Anderson's Lineage of the Absolutist State, Barrington Moore's Social Origins of 
Democracy and Dictatorship, and Eva Bellin's Stalled Democracy. This method tends to be 
historically interpretive, and attempts to account for specific historical outcomes or sets of 
comparable outcomes or processes (Ragin, 1987, p.3). It is concerned with differences and 
similarities between cases and how those factors may determine certain phenomena. The 
phenomenon this study is investigating is the dependency or autonomy of social groups in 
two Middle East/North African states (MENA), one of which is oil dependent. 
The purpose of this study is to interpret the causes for autonomy or dependency of 
social groups in Kuwait and Morocco. In order to interpret the effects of oil dependence on 
autonomy of social groups in MENA, this study will consider the historical and social 
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context that produces certain groups in Kuwait and Morocco. Interpretation will allow us to 
see why oil-dependent Kuwait shows more advanced signs of democratization while 
Morocco has experienced, in contrast, cycles of liberalization and retraction. This is also 
important in terms of regional influence between newer oil states like Kuwait, and older non-
oil states like Morocco. This dichotomy between the older and the newer states, which 
largely coincides with the oil haves and the oil have-nots, has come to be one of the 
fundamental dimensions of regional and international relations in the Middle East( Luciani, 
2005, p.86). 
Second, this study will suggest that the distribution of oil rent may increase the ability 
of certain social groups to become autonomous from the state. These findings may generalize 
to other Gulf Cooperation Council states, and oil-dependent states outside the MENA. These 
causal relationships are paramount in this study and should be investigated in other cases. 
The rentier literature does not adequately account for the autonomy of social groups 
in some rentier states. Gwenn Okruhlik (1999) notes the distribution of oil rent comes with 
certain social consequences. Wealth generated from oil receipts can be a catalyst for 
opposition to the state (Okruhlik, 1999, p. 297). Because it is distributed unequally, there are 
bound to be 'haves' and 'have nots', the latter of which may form into opposition groups. 
Okruhlik further notes that the 1990 invasion by Iraq was a watershed in this debate. During 
the war, political resistance moved to the forefront, calling for: redistribution of wealth, 
procedural social justice, accountability, and rule of law (Okruhlik, 1999, p. 301). The 
distribution of oil rent may give agency to certain social groups and allow them to mobilize 
during and after times of crisis. 
2
 The Council comprises of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
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Okruhlik notes that "state strategies chosen to manage crises- like price booms and 
busts, worldwide recession, and war- have very real, though unintended, social and political 
consequences" (p. 297). Social groups can gain agency and mobilize larger segments of the 
population during times of crises, where state strategies are based less on oil wealth and more 
on political exigencies. 
Times of crises are an important independent variable in this study. There are two 
instances of crisis central to this study- the economic crisis of the 1980's and the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Studies have shown the importance of these two periods in 
spreading political liberalization and democratization in the MENA. Samuel Huntington has 
identified the world economic crisis of the 1980s as one of the factors triggering the move 
toward economic and political liberalization in the 1990s. Peter Moore (2004) suggests the 
rentier framework essentially views fiscal crisis politics as an unfolding logic of increased 
business autonomy and policy leverage (p. 23). Other studies have shown the importance of 
the Iraqi invasion in promoting democratization in Kuwait and the Middle East in general 
(Okruhlik 1999, Moore 2004, Crystal 1990). 
Efforts to dilute or placate social forces through the distribution of oil rent can 
inadvertently strengthen certain social forces. The distribution of oil rent provides money and 
other forms of capital to social groups. Compulsory education has provided social groups 
with human capital that may lead to greater autonomy and support for democratization. This 
may be especially true for the women of Kuwait. 
Financial capital can be used to create independent institutions which increase 
autonomy. Institutional capacity independent of the state helps these groups bargain more 
effectively with the state. 
8 
Often certain social forces are promoted through patronage or extension of certain 
rights in order to dilute the power of other social forces. This can be seen in the case of 
Kuwaiti Islamists who were promoted through patronage and business incentives in the 
1970's to offset the power of the business elites (Moore 2004). In trying to weaken the power 
of a specific social group through the distribution of oil rent to other groups, a rentier state 
may inadvertently create additional politically salient groups that become stronger over time. 
Case Selection 
Kuwait was chosen because it is one of the top ten oil exporters in the world , and a 
member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Kuwait also exports natural 
gas and has significant refinery capacity. The Kuwaiti budget is heavily dependent on oil 
receipts. At times, 85% to 95% of the state budget comes from oil receipts (Moore 2004). 
Kuwait is also one of six constitutional monarchies in the MENA with an elected parliament. 
Michael Herb suggests that Kuwait may be the Arab monarchy closest to 
parliamentarism - a parliament with significant powers over the sovereign. Much rentier 
literature has focused on Kuwait (Crystal 1990, Beblawi 1990, Tetreault 1999). Herb 
suggests that the constitution is not a barrier to parliamentarism, elections are fair and 
competitive, and the tacit threat of suspension of parliament seems to have receded (Herb, 
2005, p. 178). While traditional literature suggests that oil dependence makes Kuwait more 
likely to be absolutist similar to the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia, Herb's analysis 
argues that Kuwait is the closest to parliamentarism among MENA monarchies. This is why 
Kuwait makes an excellent case selection over other gulf rentier monarchies like Bahrain, 
Qatar, and Oman. 
3
 Energy Information Administration International Energy Annual Report (2000-2004) 
4
 Herb suggests parliamentarism was achieved when kings realized that any cabinet without parliamentary 
support could not govern and that there was little option but to allow parties to appoint the government. 
9 
Kuwait is a small city state. Therefore, oil receipts reach a large majority of 
the Kuwaiti citizenry. According to Mary Ann Tetreault, Kuwait's identity as a city state 
helped preserve the autonomy of social groups. 
Even though the state has grown strong as the result of its acquisition 
of externally generated resources, it is not yet strong enough yet to negate the 
effects of extensive and regular face-to-face interactions among Kuwaitis. 
These ameliorate authoritarianism both by transmitting information and 
allowing members of the political opposition to mobilize public opinion and 
political action, and by connecting the ruling family directly to the population 
(Tetreault, 1995, p. 32). 
Morocco was chosen because it is one of two MENA monarchies without oil wealth. 
According to traditional arguments, Morocco should have a better chance to push for 
parliamentarism. Morocco has political parties, unlike Kuwait. It also has an opposition 
government in power, a condition seen as one prerequisite for democracy (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 
556). Morocco has a long history of trade unionism and anti-colonial and socialist struggles. 
Nevertheless, Morocco has often been studied as having a cycle of political liberalization 
during times of economic crisis and restricted political freedom thereafter (Cavatorta 2005). 
Such cycles of liberalization and restriction are apparent in all the monarchies. Investigating 
a failure can contribute to the understanding of the process of democratization just as a 
investigating a success can. "These comparisons help us to identify some of the proximate 
barriers to the achievement of rule by parliament and bring crucial evidence to bear on 
whether, and how, these parliaments offer a way toward a more democratic future" (Herb, 
2005, p. 170). 
Social Groups- Business elites and Islamists groups were chosen because they are 
politically salient groups in Kuwait and other rentier states. Giacomo Luciani (2005) suggests 
that one possible explanation for rentier states in the MENA pushing for wider political 
10 
participation is their strong private sector (p. 93). Moore (2004) notes that in the post colonial 
Arab world, business elites have played a prominent role in demanding greater political 
representation, creating domestic economies, and resisting the consolidation of authoritarian 
regimes (p.3). Moore (1964) suggests that the capitalist class is necessary for democracy. Eva 
Bellin (2000) identifies the conditions under which this group may see democratic 
institutions as benefiting their economic interests. 
The private sector remains strong because of its financial independence from society. 
Business elites often bargain with the state for more political influence over their economic 
interests. In countries with a more historically resilient private sector (Kuwait, Yemen, 
Tunisia, and Morocco), business associations have come to play genuine roles in formulation 
and implementation of economic policy (Moore, 2004, p.3). 
Islamist movements are politically salient in many countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Movements like the Muslim Brotherhood have networks through many MENA 
countries. Both Kuwait and Morocco have Islamist blocs or parties in their respective 
parliaments. Islamists can also use the mosque as a point of mobilization, one that itself 
enjoys a degree of autonomy in many MENA countries. This autonomy, and that derived 
from the distribution of oil rent, may allow Islamists to champion democratic institutions. 
Women as a social group will be investigated, although women may not fit the mold 
of traditional social groups. Women may identify as a social groups, as they do in women's 
organizations in Morocco, or may be part of other salient social groups. The role of women 
will provide a good contrast on how the distribution of oil rent builds human capital. In many 
developing countries, women struggle for greater social rights like education and 
employment. Oil rent helps build the human capital of women. In contrast, Michael Ross 
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(2006) suggests that rentierism reduces the agency of women by crowding them out of the 
labor market and decreasing their representation in the political process.5 "Women in oil-rich 
states tend to have less social, economic, and political influence than their counterparts in oil-
poor states" (Ross, 2006, p.2). Women were chosen because they provide an ideal example 
of what Tetreault (2001) considers the modernization effect of the distribution of oil rent. 
Other social groups common in the Arab World (i.e. the military, university students, 
workers, etc) were not chosen because they do not appear to be politically salient groups in 
the cases that fit the framework of the study. These groups do warrant further investigation. 
Contingent Democrats 
What causes these social groups push for democracy? Rentier literature suggests that 
it is not oil which makes social groups more dependent on the state. The motives of social 
groups toward democracy may be determined by the degree to which they are autonomous or 
dependent on the state. Eva Bellin (2000) argues that the pairing of material and democratic 
interests for social groups is contingent upon specific historical circumstances that may or 
may not be replicated in late developing countries. This study argues that the historical and 
social context of oil rent supplies the contingency for a pairing of these interests among 
social groups in Kuwait. 
The link between rentierism, social groups, and democracy is important to this study 
because social groups may be central to the advancement of democratization. A long 
tradition puts social forces center stage when explaining democratic outcomes. Some, like 
Barrington Moore (1966), believe the capitalist bourgeoisie are class agents for democracy. 
5
 Ross uses a cross-national quantitative large N study to suggest that female labor force participation is hurt be 
rentierism because it tend to favor sectors that employ men while crowding out sectors that tend to employ 
women. This is a result of the Dutch disease, where the crowded out sectors have higher female labor 
participation. 
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Moore's argument was that the nascent capitalist class in Western Europe came into 
competition with the traditional feudal order, motivating capitalists to create parliamentary 
institutions that would impose parliamentary control over the state. Moore argues that the 
Western path to democracy combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy after a series 
of bourgeois revolutions. "Only there did that delicate balance occur between too much and 
too little royal power which gave an important impetus to parliamentary democracy" (Moore, 
1966, p. 416). 
Bellin (2000) considers whether capitalist or labor classes played a more significant 
role in promoting democracy in late developing countries. Organized labor has played a role 
in some countries and not others. Capitalists, likewise, have played a role in some countries 
and not others. Bellin suggests that democracy in late developing countries depends on 
whether open or closed government serves the economic interests of social groups the most. 
"This analysis suggests that social forces are most likely to champion democracy when their 
economic interests put them at odds with an authoritarian state." (Bellin, 2000, p. 176). 
Bellin notes that many contemporary studies give social forces a secondary role, suggesting 
transitions to democracy are either elite driven, path dependent on state institutions, or a 
strategic choice for democratic reform. 
The motives of social groups may hinge on the degree to which these groups are 
dependent on the state (either for capital accumulation or state social benefits); in fear of 
state repression, and dependent on their aristocratic position vis-a-vis the rest of the 
population. "With regards to capital, state dependence refers to the degree which private 
sector profitability is subject to discretionary support from the state." (Bellin, 2000, p. 180).6 
6
 Such support generally refers to subsidized inputs, protected market position, close collaboration in the 
definition of economic policy and state containment of labor and the capital poor. 
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In an authoritarian country, the objective of promoting the private sector may not be 
economic growth for the prosperity of the nation as a whole but for the benefit of state elites. 
Bellin suggests that "cozy collaboration" with the state is often the key to economic success 
for capitalists and is heightened in late developing states. "Such heightened state dependence 
makes private sector capitalists wary of embracing political processes unpopular with state 
elites." (Bellin, 2000, p. 182) Also, in developing countries where workers are potentially 
well mobilized, democracy may undermine the basic interests of many capitalists (Bellin, 
200, p. 181).7 
Bellin makes two observations relevant to this study. First, the rentier framework 
suggests the private sector in an oil rentier state is dependent on the state (for subsidies, 
contracts, investment, etc.) and not likely to see greater political inclusion as the best means 
to achieve their material interests. Second, a capitalist class that is less dependent on the state 
may see democratic institutions as the best means for achieving economic interests. 
It is worth noting that the working class may also be motivated to champion 
democracy depending on how dependent the group is on the state. State dependence refers to 
the degree to which organized labor depends on state support for its organizational viability, 
vitality, and clout (Bellin, 2000, p. 183). States may provide labor with financial and 
organizational support in exchange for loyal and self restraint. Labor fears jeopardizing the 
flow of state benefits by embracing political projects that may evoke the wrath of state elites 
(Bellin, 2000, p. 183). Workers as a social group are not included in this study but still 
warrant further investigation. 
7
 T.H. Marshall and others believe that the capitalist class did not support extending political rights to workers, 
who may use the vote to undermine business interests 
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Democracy holds intrinsic value for all social groups. It offers capitalists 
accountability, transparency, and more predictable influence over economic policy, and 
provides civil rights and liberties to the labor class, such as freedoms of speech and 
association. These require strong democratic institutions that can check the executive to some 
degree. Bellin argues that fiscal crisis or political exigencies internal to the authoritarian 
states could lead it to reduce its sponsorship of private sector capital, leading capitalists to 
reconsider the advantage of informal coziness over formalized accountability as the surest 
route to profitability. The capitalist class is more likely to see democracy as the best way to 
fulfill economic interests when it is autonomous from the state. This echoes Barrington 
Moore's (1964) argument that an independent bourgeoisie is necessary for democracy: "No 
bourgeois, no democracy." 
Bellin's argument about late developing countries may account for social groups in 
certain oil-dependent states. Kuwait has a prosperous private sector with a significant degree 
of institutional capacity and autonomy from the state. While the rentier literature suggests the 
private sector is heavily dependent on the state, Bellin could argue that their autonomy from 
the state makes them more likely to champion democratic institutions which are good for 
business. This study will show this is true for other groups with autonomy from the state. 
The social groups chosen for this study are among the politically salient groups in 
both Kuwait and Morocco. The rentier literature suggests social groups in rentier states are 
less likely to push for democracy. Yet, in certain small rentier states like Kuwait, the 
distribution of oil rent may actually mobilize social groups. The distribution of oil rent in 
Kuwait can turn social groups into political actors, rather than limiting their choices. This 
occurs in part because the distribution of oil rent can give social groups autonomy from the 
15 
state by building human capital and institutionally capacity that can be used to mobilize in 
opposition to the state. Again we see the converse situation in Morocco, where similar social 
groups are able to mobilize and lobby the state, but often follow a cycle of liberalization and 
retraction of liberties due to the dependence of these groups on the state. 
16 
CHAPTER II 
OIL vs. DEMOCRACY 
Quantitative vs. Qualitative Rentier Studies 
Investigating the agency of social groups in an oil monarchy presents challenges 
depending on the method chosen. Traditional rentier studies have used both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Many quantitative studies focus on the structural effects of oil-
dependence (Sachs and Warner 1995, Ross 2001, Herb 2005). Using time-lagged cross-
national data sets, these studies use economic indicators to explain characteristics of rentier 
states. It is difficult in a quantitative study to account for the social structure of a state, and 
the effects of oil dependence on that structure. Michael Ross (2001) tested the hypothesis that 
rentierism prevents the formation of independent social groups by measuring government 
spending as a percentage of GDP. While Ross finds the hypothesis statistically robust in his 
cross-national study, he admits that the hypothesis cannot be tested with a regression analysis 
directly without good indicators of civic institutions and social groups (Ross, 2001, p. 347). 
This measurement quantitatively does not account properly for the social context of a rentier 
state. 
Qualitative studies have often relied on comparative case studies to explain certain 
characteristics of rentier states (Beblawi 1990, Luciani 1990, Crystal 1995, Sandbakken 2005) 
Camilla Sandbakken (2005) found that oil rent prevented the formation of social groups in 
three rentier states. Comparative studies have used variations of John Stuart Mill's (1843) 
method of agreement to suggest that the distribution of oil rent prevents social groups from 
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pushing toward democratization. Little comparative case work, however, examines the 
impact of oil rent on social groups in contrast with a similar state in the region without oil as 
this study does. This provides a better contrast with regards to the prospects for democracy in 
a given region. 
Through the historical analysis of a rentier state, one can see that efforts to dilute 
opposition can actually strengthen it. Building off of Michael Herb's (2005) argument, it is 
important not only to show that the distribution of oil rent provides agency to social forces in 
Kuwait, but that is also increases the chance for democratization in comparison to other 
MENA monarchies. A case-oriented comparative analysis is warranted to investigate social 
forces in a rentier state, and contrast them with social forces in a non-rentier state. 
The Effects of Oil, Mineral Wealth, and Rent on Growth and Democracy 
In order to show weaknesses in the rentier theories, the framework itself must be 
investigated. Proponents of the rentier framework argue that social groups in Kuwait are 
dependent on the state because of oil rent. Money generated from oil can be used to limit the 
political agency of social groups in several ways. Rentier state theories are important to this 
study because they are the prevailing explanations of why oil states tend to be anti-
democratic and experience slow economic growth (Beblawi 1990, Sachs and Warner 1995, 
Ross 2001, Sandbaaken 2006). The political and economic effects of rentierism explain why 
social groups lack agency and are dependent on the state. The theories suggest that the 
structural effects of oil prevent social groups from gaining autonomy and mobilizing in 
opposition to the state. This study does not refute all of the observations of the rentier 
framework; rather it only suggests that the analyses are limited. Observations based on the 
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theory have held in many rentier states and even held in Kuwait during the boom years of the 
1970's. 
Mother Nature may not be without a sense of irony. Many of the poorer and 
politically troubled nations in the world are rich in natural resources. Furthermore, many of 
these states rely on natural resources for a large share of their GDP and government revenue. 
While these resource-dependent developing states are not necessarily the poorest or least 
democratic, it may be more than a coincidence that certain resource abundances correlate 
with a lack of economic development and democratization. It is ironic that while these 
resources may inhibit economic growth in some countries, many democratic industrialized 
countries rely on them for their economic growth. Oil is case in point. Major oil reserves are 
centered in areas like the Middle East and Africa that have been seen as lacking 
democratization or promoting autocracy and authoritarianism. Ten of the fifteen top oil 
exporting states are in the Middle East, and most have had authoritarian regimes since 
independence. Does oil impede democratization? 
Political scientists and economists have studies the effect of natural resource wealth 
on developing states since the 1950's. In that era, many development economists believed 
that natural resource wealth was a blessing on late-developing states. These states were seen 
as lacking the investment capital needed to make use of their labor bases. It seemed natural 
that revenue from oil and other natural resources provided this capital as well as provide the 
government with a revenue stream to provide public goods. 
Structuralists objected to the general consensus, doubting whether natural resource 
wealth could stimulate other parts of the economy. Some suggested that primary commodity 
exporters would suffer from a decline in trade. 
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Rentier State Theories 
Rentier state theories are observed effects that occur when a state relies heavily on 
external rent for government revenue. It is one of the predominant theories used to explain 
why Middle Eastern states relying on oil rent fail to democratize. Oil rent refers to revenue 
derived from the sale of oil products that accrues directly into government coffers. It is 
considered rent because few are engaged in the generation of the oil receipts, and few control 
the revenue. While oil export receipts are considered a form of rent, agricultural exports are 
not. This is because agricultural exports do not produce rent, since the export revenue in 
many cases goes directly to private actors, and requires a larger portion of the population for 
labor for a given value of the export (Ross, 1990, p. 332). 
Hazem Beblawi (1990) defines a rentier state as a state relying substantially on 
external rent, with only a few engaged in the generation of this rent, and the government 
being the principle recipient of that rent (Beblawi, 1990, p. 87). The majority of the 
population is merely involved in the distribution and usilation of the rent. This concept has 
direct political implications. "The economic power thus bestowed upon the few would allow 
them to seize political power as well, or else induce the political elite to take over the 
external rent from them without major political disruption." (Beblawi, 1990, p. 88). 
Political Effects of the Rentier State 
Rentier state theories argue that rentier states share certain characteristics that inhibit 
democratization. These political effects highlight the dependence the population has on the 
apparatus in control of the rent. 
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1.) Revenue from oil rent means the state does not have to tax its population. This 
"taxation effect reduces citizens' demands for accountability as well as their desire to 
participate politically. It also breaks the linkages between ruler and the ruled. This in turn 
makes democracy less likely. This 'no taxation, no representation' thesis means ' states that 
do not face a fiscal crisis and enjoy continuing access to exogenous rent will be able to 
postpone democratization indefinitely.' (Luciani, 1990, p. 134). 
2.) Rent allows governments to buy off political opposition in order to gain legitimacy. 
Since oil rents accrue directly to the state, the government has discretionary power over how 
that revenue is spent. To gain consent and legitimacy from the general population, the 
government can use rewards or social welfare to placate social groups. A welfare system 
allows the state to redistribute income to the population through education, healthcare, 
infrastructure, and employment. In a rentier state, the government is often the biggest 
employer. Thus while only a few benefit directly from the rent, through welfare and other 
benefits like land gifts the population too becomes a rentier class engaging in rent-seeking 
behavior. "Individuals are likely to see rent seeking behavior a superior alternative to 
alliance-building or political unrest as a way to induce redistribution." (Sanbakken, 2006, p. 
138). Certain social groups, especially women, may be dependent on the state for these 
services, which are often free and compulsory. 
3.) Patronage networks are created by loyalty and legitimacy in a rentier state. These 
networks involve the award of personal favors in the form of public sector jobs and the 
distribution of public resources through licenses, contracts, political office8, and projects. 
This can lead to an increase in corruption and bribery. Those involved in such activities may 
8
 This can be seen in elections in oil-dependent states. Often, the candidates win if they are close with the 
regime and thus have access to state resources. 
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resist democracy due to the fact that it may involve a heightened level of transparency and 
accountability (Sandbakken, 2006, p. 138). 
4.) States can also use oil rent to fund repressive measures to control opposition and the 
population in general. This repression effect often takes place as oil revenue declines, leaving 
less money for patronage and welfare. Repression is often measured as military spending as a 
percentage of GDP. Repression of political opposition and dissent can be done through 
internal security forces, banning of political parties, and independent media. A widely used 
example of this was SAVAK in Iran. 
5.) The rentier framework suggests that oil revenue can be used to inhibit the formation 
of social groups and independent associations. It has been argued by proponents of rentier 
state theories that oil rent effects the class structure of a state. Oil rentiers do not have an 
independent middle classes that can become a source of opposition (Sandbakken, 2006, p. 
139). This suggests oil rent heightens the dependency of a capitalist class because the state is 
the center of most economic activity. Oil revenue is also used to placate dissent through 
patronage networks, thus heightening the dependency of the capitalist class and other social 
groups on the state. 
6.) Ross (2001) suggests that oil regimes use revenue to prevent the formation of 
independent social groups that may demand political representation and participation. "When 
oil revenues provide a government with enough money, it will use its munificence to prevent 
the mobilization of social groups independent of the state" (Ross, 2001, p. 334). Ross also 
argues that oil rent can be used to hinder the development of social capital, which he 
considers civic institutions that lie above the family and below the state. This is also 
9
 SAVAK, or Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (National Intelligence and Security Organization), 
was the domestic security and intelligence service of Iran from 1957 to 1979 
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important to the argument of the study because social groups cannot bargain effectively with 
the state without a certain institutional capacity, though it will not be described as social 
capital. Unlike Ross's findings, this study shows that the distribution of rent can promote the 
development independent institutional capacity given certain conditions, which contributes to 
the mobilization of social groups in opposition to state autocracy. 
Economic Effects of the Rentier State 
Another characteristic of rentierism is that it effects modernization and economic 
development. In Seymore Lipset's (1959) book Political Man, he argues that economic 
development is positively correlated with democracy. This has implications for rentier state 
theories because some rentier states show improvements in measurements of development 
like per capita GDP, education, literacy, and urbanization. The modernization effect argues 
that the population fails to move into industrial and service jobs, rendering them less likely to 
push for democratization (Ross, 2001, p. 357). These theories are important because they link 
the economic effects of oil to the political and social context of a rentier state. 
Countless studies document the correlation between abundant hard rock and mineral 
resources (oil, diamonds, and copper) and negative economic outcomes (Ross 2001, Sachs 
and Warner 1995). The main argument suggests natural resource abundance may stunt 
economic growth, measured as percentage increase in GDP. Take the case of Nigeria; I ts 
government has netted 350 billion dollars from oil revenue since its independence in 1963. 
Yet its economy has shrunk in terms of purchasing power parity. In 1970, Nigeria's per 
capita GDP was $1,113. By 2000, it was only $1,084. 
The story of natural resource booms can also be seen in the experience of the 
Netherlands and its discovery of a huge natural gas deposit in the 1960's. The sudden 
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increase in wealth led to a recession . W.M. Corden and J. Peter Neary (1982) described that 
recession as the effect of a boom or windfall resource gain on the country's economy. First, 
revenue that came from the resource boom gave people more money while inflating prices. 
Second, the resource boom lured workers and capital toward the booming resource sector an 
out of other sectors.12 The principle finding is that a resource boom can negatively affect 
economic development of a state, which can make that state less likely these state will 
democratize. 
The resource curse theory is a variation of the Dutch disease model and looks at 
natural resource abundance over time. The seminal work on the resource curse was done by 
Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995). Their study of ninety seven countries over a 
nineteen year period investigates the effects of mineral wealth on GDP growth. Their results 
show countries (1960-1990) that relied heavily on natural resource exports had slower 
growth rates than mineral-poor countries. From 1960 to 1990, GDP per capita in mineral-rich 
countries increased 1.7% compared with 3% for mineral poor countries. Mineral-rich 
countries grew by .8% from 1970-1990 compared with 2.1-3.7% from their mineral-poor 
counterparts (Sachs and Warner, 1995, p. 31). The more reliant a country is on primary 
exports like natural resources, the slower the economic growth13. 
10
 This led the Economist magazine in 1977 to coin the term the "Dutch Disease". 
nThe higher real income derives from a boom leads to increased spending on the non-tradable sector, leading to 
an increase in their price. In order to restore equilibrium between service output and excess demand, prices are 
raised to alleviate excess demand. While this price increase is measured in local currency, tradable goods are 
not. This leads to an overvaluation of the real exchange rate. This makes goods in lagging sectors uncompetitive 
and imports very cheap. 
12
 The boom leads to an increase in wages, leading labor to shift from lagging sectors to the boom sector or non-
tradable sectors. These effects are more prominent depending on the level of domestic ownership (Leite and 
Weisman 8-9) Shifts in labor can also lead to a rural exodus, as farm workers head to urban center and hold 
down local domestic producers who can't compete with rising wages (Richards and Waterbury 15) 
13
 The Sachs/Warner model shows that an increase of a single standard deviation in primary exports leads to a 
reduction in growth rate of around 1%. 
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The resource curse carries with it political ramifications. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 
(2002) found that natural resource wealth may weaken state institutions. They suggest the 
resource curse only hits countries with "grabber friendly" institutions, which divert 'scarce 
entrepreneurial resources out of production and into unproductive activities as a result of 
natural resource wealth.' (Melhum, Moene, and Torvik, 2002, p. 5). Sachs and Warner 
considered a similar rent approach to institutional decay, but fid the hypothesis that the 
resource curse leads to institutional decay empirically unimportant14. These institutions do 
not promote a robust private sector. This fact seems to contradict the experiences of Gulf oil 
states with strong capitalist classes like Kuwait. 
Specific to weakened state institutions is the effect natural resource abundance has on 
the level of corruption of a state. Some suggest resource abundance can lead to violence and 
looting by financial rebel groups, warlords, and civil wars (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 
2002, p. 7). Leitie and Wiesmann (1999) suggest corruption15 is a determinant of slow 
economic growth in natural resource countries. Corruption often takes the form of rent 
seeking behavior, and reduces state income levels, thus slowing economic growth16. This is 
not the case with other resources such as agriculture or food which generate less rent and are 
not associated with increased corruption. Corruption also causes the private sector to see 
transparent democratic institutions as the best means of achieving its economic interests. 
Critique of the Rentier State Theory 
14 i 
Whatever the exact nature of the adverse effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth, the 
evidence suggests that it is not simply a proxy for bureaucratic inefficiency and protectionism." (Sachs and 
Warner 10) 
15
 Corruption typically focuses of public officials using their position for private gain, though corruption also 
occurs in the private sector. Corruption is seen as having two effects in relation to natural resources. 
16
 In the specific case of rapid economic growth brought on by oil and mineral discoveries, the accrual of a 
majority of the revenue directly to the government is liable to exacerbate the incidences of rent-seeking 
behavior (Leite and Weismann 19) 
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Michael Herb (2005) considers whether oil rent has a completely negative effect on 
democracy. Herb suggests that oil rent-driven development should not be compared to the 
development of a productive economy. For instance, Kuwait has high measures of 
development (i.e. per capita GDP, urbanization, education). If Kuwait is compared to Canada, 
in terms of the positive effects of wealth on democracy, Kuwait looks less democratic. The 
raised measures of development leave much of Kuwait's authoritarian nature unexplained. 
Herb suggests that this leads to an exaggeration of the statistical significance of oil. "In the 
real world, Kuwait's wealth should be compared to that of Canada only if we think Kuwait's 
wealth has the same effect on likelihood that it will be democratic." (Herb, 2005, p. 4). 
Herb comes to a more ambiguous conclusion. He suggests that rent raises 
development indicators and that this has to be taken into account when one measures the 
impact of rent on a state. He does conclude that rentierism and oil-dependence have an 
influence on democratization but not necessarily as much as income, region, and the 
percentage of a population that is Muslim. 
There are other small N case studies that show oil may have a marginally positive 
effect on a state. John Clark (1997), in his study of Congo Brazzaville, argues that oil wealth 
created a white collar middle class, and that contributed to a brief bout of democratization 
there.17 (p. 74). Oil rent may not be a gift, but it cannot be categorized as a curse. 
This study will take into account the rentier framework, as well as the historical and 
social context that exists independent of oil to form key social groups. The economic and 
political effects of oil rent are not set in stone and are often based on quantitative analysis 
that cannot paint a complete picture. This study suggests that certain social groups have a 
historical presence, an institutional capacity, and are given autonomy and agency due in part 
17
 Clark concludes that "on the whole, Congo's oil wealth slightly increased its chances of being democratic". 
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to the distribution of oil rent. Often mobilization in opposition to the state is directly linked to 
the unequal distribution of rent and comes to the forefront during times of crisis. This can 
best be seen when an oil rentier is compared with a non-oil state in the same region with a 
similar state structure. 
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CHAPTER III 
KUWAIT: AUTONOMOUS SOCIAL GROUPS IN AN OIL-RICH 
MONARCHY 
Politically Salient Groups in Kuwait 
Kuwait has a history of influential social groups, some existing long before British 
influence and the discovery of oil in 1938. "Legends about the founding of Kuwait stresses 
the relative equality among its original leading families" (Tetreault, 1995, p. 31). Out of 
these leading families came one important social group, the business elites. Many of the 
leading merchant families- commonly known as the Asil merchants- have always had a 
relationship with the ruling family and the state. The rentier framework suggests this 
capitalist class engaged in rent seeking behavior and is dependent on the state. Analysis of 
the private sector in Kuwait will show that this social group used the distribution of oil rent 
to build capital and create an institutional capacity via the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. This allows the private sector to be autonomous from the state and view more 
input in economic policy as a better route to secure their economic interests than patronage or 
other forms of state dependence. 
Islamists are another politically salient group. The rentier framework suggests this 
group is part of the rentier class that is dependent on the state for social services and may fear 
the repressive apparatuses of the state. Some newer social groups like the Islamists were 
promoted by the state to dilute the power of social groups that may challenge the state's 
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power. Moore (2004) suggests this was the case in Kuwait during the 1970's when groups 
like the Shia minority, tribal Bedus, and civil employees were given business incentives to 
create a merchant class in opposition to the dominant Asil merchants. Building off the larger 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, Islamists have been able to build human capital through the 
distribution of oil rent and patronage, use that distribution (as well as times of crisis) as a 
rallying cry for mobilization and developed an institutional capacity in the Islamic 
Constitutional Movement allowing the group to be autonomous from the state. This 
autonomy has led Islamists to seek more political inclusion as well as more power for 
parliament over the executive. 
While women in Kuwait are not as politically organized as their counterparts in 
Morocco, their inclusion in this study demonstrates the modernization effect of the 
distribution of oil rent. The rentier literature suggests women are also part of the rentier class. 
Ross's analysis suggests oil rent economically and politically marginalizes women. Yet 
social welfare derived from the distribution of oil rent built human capital, and increased 
labor force participation for women in Kuwait. While it can be argued that women remain 
dependent and have not developed the autonomy or institutional capacity of other groups, 
this study shows that the distribution of oil rent has allowed women to gain a more prominent 
role in the Kuwaiti economy and society, and gain substantive political rights. 
Contingent Capitalists: Business Elites, the KCCL and Political Inclusion 
Creation of the Kuwaiti Merchant Class 
Business elites have a historical relationship with the state and have developed the 
institutional capacity and autonomy through the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and 
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Industry and a strong Kuwaiti private sector. Much of the analysis of business elites in 
Kuwait is drawn from the work of Peter Moore (2004). 
In pre-colonial Kuwaiti society, politics and commerce were interdependent. In 1752, 
the al-Sabah family established rule over what would become Kuwait. This family was a 
member of the Bani Utub tribe that settled in Kuwait in the early 1700's and gained 
dominance in the region. Central to Bani commerce was the pearl trade, and from this trade 
grew a merchant class18. Merchant elites provided revenue to the state via the system of zakat 
(a religious tax). The zakat provided financial support, while the merchants also provided 
manpower support from their labor and slave pools, leading to a close relationship between 
Bani merchants and the al-Sabah family (Moore, 2004, p. 29). Thus, well before British rule, 
Kuwaiti merchants openly exercised influence commensurate with a perception of equality 
(Moore, 2004, p. 31). The dominant merchant families in the Bani tribe became known as the 
Asil merchants. 
Kuwait's location and size left it vulnerable to outside power, a trend that continues 
throughout the 20 century. Faced with pressure from the Ottomans and the al-Sa'uds, 
Kuwait became a British protectorate in 1899. Tetreault (1999) and Moore (2004) argue that 
this relationship to Britain as a protectorate marked the onset of the rentier state in Kuwait. 
Reliance on merchants shifted to reliance on British rule. The British alliance helped the Asil 
merchants, whose economic fortunes were now increasingly tied to British imperial economy 
(Crystal, 1995, p. 13). Merchant elites further prospered during WWI and its aftermath. 
Besides increasing their wealth, merchant elites increased their organizational 
capacity. Political movements in 1922 and 1938 helped the dominant Asil merchants 
18
 The social structure of the merchant class was stratified along lines of specialization; a high class dealing with 
the pearl industry and commodity trading, a middle class dealing with transfer of subsistence product, and a 
lower class performing more general economic activities (Moore, 2004, p. 33) 
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organize institutionally and politically. 19 Leadership for these groups was decided by 
elections among the Asil elite. Jill Crystal (1995) notes these movements afforded merchants 
opportunities in electoral politics and collective action (p.50). The movements were 
unsuccessful because merchant policy initiatives were not inclusive enough to garner wider 
political support (Moore, 2004, p. 40). Merchant elites were a politically salient group long 
before the onset of oil in the 1930's, and independence. 
Building Business Autonomy: The Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Kuwait gained independence in 1961. Shortly before, merchant elites were 
instrumental in the founding of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The KCCI 
developed into an autonomous institution capable of bargaining with the state over economic 
policy. Its formation was in response to the weakening of merchant-controlled institutions 
during state expansion in the 1950's (Moore, 2004, p. 46). 
The KCCI was established by Emiri decree in 1959. The Chamber established by-
laws to govern internal activities and executive board elections. "Internal organization was a 
prerogative of chamber organizers, with no state involvement or appointment." (Moore, 2004, 
p. 47). The by-laws established voting rules in which any member could vote or run for the 
executive board. The Chambers finances were drawn primarily from subscription and 
authentication fees. According to the KCCI website, there are currently 79,000 Kuwaitis 
represented by a board of 24 directors serving four-year terms. It is the only business 
chamber in Kuwait, and its establishment was a collective effort by the Asil Merchants 
(Moore, 2004, p. 48). The main purpose of the KCCI was to be an institution through which 
19
 During the 1938 Majlis movement, merchants organized into several institutions19 aimed at gaining leverage 
with the ruling family. Examples of these are the creation of the Kuwait City Municipality, whose executive 
board was controlled by merchants. An education council was organized by merchants in 1936 to manage 
schools. 
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merchants (predominantly Asil) could express opinions on national economic policy and 
influence the country's founding economic laws. 
The rentier framework suggests capitalists in a rentier state organize to influence 
policy or to access oil rent. Though the rentier framework suggests the KCCI organization is 
the embodiment of rent-seeking behavior, Moore argues that the business-state relationship 
was not primarily a rent-seeking arrangement. "Interactions between business elites and the 
state in the 1960's were an extension of the wider social and political struggle that had 
marked Kuwaiti's pre-independence years." (Moore, 2004, p. 52). The KCCI continues to be 
an autonomous institution that seeks involvement in the formation of economic policy, 
transparency and accountability from government, and more influence in the National 
Assembly. 
As Kuwait increased oil output through the 1960's, the KCCI was given a degree of 
influence on economic issues. KCCI was instrumental in developing early economic laws, 
many of which reinforced the dominance of Asil merchants. Yet, the final say always rested 
with the Emir. Access to the state was crucial for the merchant elites. KCCI leadership 
pressed the Emir for a more institutionalized planning body to deal with certain economic 
issues. A Planning Board was created in 1962, though it was not a decisive arbitrator on 
economic issues. It was, however, an institutionalized venue for the KCCI to exchange 
information with state officials (Moore, 2004, p. 55). 
The KCCI also helped candidates get elected to the Maljis, or the National Assembly. 
Moore notes the KCCI took advantage of Diwaniyyas20 to influence the election of assembly 
members (p. 50). Business elites also benefited from the perception as being the only national 
opposition following the 1938 Maljis movement. "Consequently, assemblies of the 1960's 
20
 Diwainyyas are meetings at households were Kuwaiti men and women talk about affairs of the state. 
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and early 1970's marked the high point of business influence in the only elected assembly in 
the region." (Moore, 2004, p. 51). 
Creation of the Kuwaiti Rentier State 
The influence of the merchant elite was dampened following the 1970's oil boom. A 
rise in oil prices and increase in output brought massive revenue into Kuwait. As the state 
increased its revenue, it became less dependent on the KCCI. "By the mid-1970's, state 
officials and the monarchy ignored most KCCI attempts at policy input and altered 
distributional policies to enrich rivals to traditional elite, thus building a wider network of 
support." (Moore, 2004, p. 85). Less influence and more state involvement in the private 
sector reduced the agency of the business elites. This is an example of the rentier framework 
playing out; patronage through the distribution of oil rent can be used to offset the influence 
of any group in opposition to the state. In the 1970's, the state attempted to create a new class 
of economic elite. This involved members of the ruling family entering private business. This 
is seen by Moore (2004) and Crystal (1995) as a clear violation of the unspoken merchant-
ruler pact of the 1960's. Business opportunities were also supplied to civil servants21 and 
Islamists. Collectively these groups came to define themselves in opposition to the type of 
leftist, Arab nationalism predominant among KCCI elites (Moore, 2004, p. 90). Business 
elites did prosper during the oil boom as the private sector increased dramatically with new 
merchants prospering from government support. 
The Kuwaiti government also became increasingly frustrated with a parliament that 
refused to approve state plans regarding the oil industry, causing the emir to suspend 
parliament and civil rights in 1976. Parliament's dissolution, and the lack of merchant protest, 
confirmed that KCCI involvement in all areas of political participation was not a given 
21
 This violated a constitutional law barring civil servants from engaging in private enterprise 
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(Moore, 2004, p. 100). A nascent stock market was set up by the state with no input from the 
KCCI. What is important here is that the KCCI weathered the 1970's with little intra-
associational tension, investment in institutional capabilities and public relations assets 
(Moore, 2004, p. 120). 
Parts of the rentier framework play out, and parts do not. The oil boom of the 1970's allowed 
the Kuwaiti state to marginalize social groups politically. Social groups were in part 
incorporated into a rentier class, looking to the state for patronage and social services. 
However, it did not destroy the institutional capacity of all independent social groups. 
The merchant elites continued to prosper, though at the price of decreased agency. The 
prosperity built capital that is used later to mobilize against the state, and increase the groups 
autonomy from the state. 
Fiscal Crisis and Political Mobilization 
The economic crises of the 1980's and the invasion by Iraq in 1990 showed the state 
was not fully autonomous from Kuwaiti social groups. The 1980's brought on a drop in oil 
prices due to a worldwide recession. The loss in oil revenue hurt the ruling family, and was 
compounded by the crash of the stock market in 1983. The state's fiscal and political 
vulnerability in the 1980's opened the door for the reassertion of the political opposition and 
the reinstatement of parliament. Fiscal vulnerabilities also meant the state needed the private 
sector, if not to contribute economic solutions, then at least to share some political heat 
(Moore, 2004, p. 120). The state looked to the KCCI for economic policy analysis that gave 
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business elites extended influence within the government apparatus, especially with debt 
repayment from the stock market crash . 
Islamists became the premier opposition group. This forced the state to promoted its 
business ties to undercut Islamist support opposite of the government's policies during the 
1970's. 23 By developing new allies, the emir had inadvertently politicized them (Crystal, 
1995, p. 101). When parliament was again suspended in 198624, a pro democracy movement 
led by Islamists, nationalists, and business elites petitioned the government for reinstatement 
of parliament. KCCI elites were able to use Diwaniyyas as important venues for venting of 
opposition demands. "In a rerun of the events of 1921 and 1938, merchant elite's were 
making a play for their 'rightful place' in Kuwaiti social and political life." (Moore, 2004, p. 
123). The 1980's economic crisis gives social groups the opportunity to mobilize beyond 
their base and demand political change. By 1990, all strands of opposition pushed for the 
reinstatement of parliament, a process that was interrupted on August 2 of that year. 
1990 Iraq Invasion 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990. This invasion helped boost the position of the 
KCCI, as well as other groups. "Opposition groups in exile during occupation acquire 
unparalleled leverage." (Moore, 2004, p. 124). Moore notes business elites played important 
roles both inside and outside occupied Kuwait. Business elites help fund resistance inside 
occupied Kuwait. The emir called for a convention of government and opposition groups in 
Saudi Arabia during the occupation. "Among the oppositions demands at the conference was 
22
 Most of the big debtors were members of the royal family and the newer merchant class. The bailout plan was 
designed with expert help from the KCCI, which worried opposition groups who thought the KCCI was trying 
to undercut their influence. 
23
 This was in response to Islamists tension in other countries following the 1797 Iranian revolution and other 
events. Islamists were responsible for several car bombings in Kuwait in the early 1980's. 
24
 Factors in the suspension were the assassination attempt on the emir in 1985, accusations by the parliament 
that the minister of oil was corrupt, as well as the opposition's resistance to the state's bank-bailout and debt-
repayment plans following the crash of the stock market. 
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an assertion for the monarchy to stop running Kuwait's finances as a family show. The crown 
prince had no recourse but to commit to new elections after liberation." (Moore, 2004, p. 
124). It was this stage that the business and the opposition asserted themselves as a force in 
Kuwaiti politics. 
In the 1992 elections, the KCCI placed members of its leadership in parliament, with 
the goal of focusing on a greater role for business elites in economic policy and management. 
Parliament again became a venue for business access to policymaking. Herb (2005) notes 
that after the 1990 invasion the tacit threat of the suspension of parliament ceded. This 
benefited the KCCI, and other social groups mobilized from the invasion and occupation. 
Business elites, through the institutional capacity of the KCCI, were able to impact 
the government through economic policy, as well as politically during times of crisis and 
suspended civil liberties. The group is the most organized and well funded of the Kuwaiti 
social groups. Some of the rentier framework does play out; the business-state social contract 
of the 1960's, as Crystal would put it, can be seen as an attempt by the state to placate dissent 
of arguably its most powerful social group. This is a charge other opposition groups have 
levied against the Asil merchants as well. Despite this, it is clear that the business elites have 
developed independent of oil revenue, as they have had a relationship with the ruling family 
since before colonial times. 
Distribution of rent through patronage has helped the group build up its institutional 
capacity and autonomy, though it has reduced its political leverage at times. Though not 
solely manifested as a political opposition group, the business elite's influence over 
economic policy and role in supporting parliament as a venue for policymaking and 
25
 Parliament could still be suspended by the emir, but he would have to call for elections immediately. In the 
past, parliament could be suspended for an indefinite amount of time. 
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amendments is important to the development of the Kuwaiti political context. Though more 
economically driven than politically, the business elites call for more inclusion in policy 
leaves the door open for more inclusion by many groups into Kuwaiti policy. This follows 
Bellin's model, democracy for capitalists is contingent on that groups being autonomous 
from the state, and seeing democratic institutions as favoring their economic success. 
Business elites have often voiced the opinion that the weakness in the Kuwaiti economy is 
the mismanagement by the royal family. Business elites do not seek a bigger piece of the pie, 
as the rentier framework suggests, they seek a more predictable and accountable market from 
which to operate. 
Contingent Islamists: Mobilization, the ICM, and Electoral Reform 
Islamists have developed into a politically salient group in Kuwait, due in part to the 
distribution of oil rent. Through the Islamic Constitutional Movement and the larger Muslim 
Brotherhood movement, Kuwaiti Islamists have pushed for greater inclusion in the political 
discourse of Kuwait. Following the framework of the study, the Islamists social group has 
developed both independent of oil rent and has been mobilized by the distribution of oil rent. 
By developing an institutional capacity and autonomy from the state, Islamists have evolved 
into a political salient group that helps facilitate the push of social opposition for 
democratization in Kuwait. 
Creation of Kuwaiti Islamists 
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1952. The early Brotherhood 
was often influenced by its interactions with sister movements elsewhere in the Arab world, 
through Kuwaiti students abroad, as well as expatriate professionals (like teachers and 
engineers). The Brotherhood got much of its organizational influence from the parent-
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organization in Egypt. The Social Reform Society- the legal manifestation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait- largely concentrated on social, educational, and charitable activities, 
but the broader movement, though lacking any formal status, did enter political affairs 
(Brown, 2007, p. 6). Islamists were often promoted by the ruling family in both business and 
parliament to counter the influence of the business associations via the KCCI (Moore, 2004, 
p. 85). The goal of the ruling family was to create a new social class that could compete with 
the dominant Asil merchants, and not the state. This allowed Islamists during the 1960's and 
1970's to become increasingly familiar with the parliamentary system, and build capital. 
Much of this comes from the distribution of rent to Islamists through patronage, welfare, and 
compulsory education. 
Fiscal Crisis and Political Mobilization 
The Brotherhood remained a marginal group until the 1980's. The Brotherhood equivocated 
to the suspension of parliament in 1976, partly a measure of support for the government that 
promoted their prosperity during the oil boom (Brown, 2007, p. 5). Nathan Brown (2007) 
suggests this hurt the Brotherhood's legitimacy among the poorer Kuwaitis they supposedly 
represented. With the restoration of parliament in 1981, the Islamists presence in parliament 
became more active, though still holding only a few seats. Moore notes that an Islamists 
Oft 
alliance soon formed . This is the period of the first crisis, the drop in oil prices of the early 
1980's and the crash of the stock market in 1983. 
Islamists used the unequal distribution of wealth, especially biasing the poorer Shia 
minority, as a rallying cry for return to traditional Islamic values. By the 1980's, the Islamists 
movement, spearheaded by the Brotherhood, had become more of an opposition to the ruling 
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 Between the more traditional Muslim Brotherhood's social reform society and the more conservative Salafist 
Islamic Heritage Society 
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family that the business elite. Government efforts to divide Islamists opposition through 
gerrymandering did not quell radical elements. Car bombings in 1983 were followed by an 
unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Emir in 1985. When parliament was again 
suspended in 1986, Islamists stood with other opposition groups in calling for a reinstatement 
in parliament. 
1990 Iraq Invasion 
The Iraqi invasion in 1990 proved to be a watershed for the mobilization of Islamists 
as well as other opposition groups. The occupation of Kuwait permanently changed the 
Brotherhood's political role, resulting in the creation of Al-Haraka Al-Dostooriya Al-
Islamiya or the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM). The efforts of the Brotherhood to 
subvert the occupying Iraqi forces and feed intelligence to US led forces during the 
occupation helped restructured its leadership; bringing in younger leaders to replace those 
that fled during the occupation (Brown, 2007, p. 6). This younger generation adopted 
political language that had broader appeal, and created the ICM. Following the liberation of 
Kuwait in March of 1991, the ICM was formalized and became an organization independent 
of the larger Muslim Brotherhood. Following the reinstatement of parliament in 1992, 
Islamists, through the ICM, won four seats in parliament. 
The Islamists movement was mobilized by the invasion and occupation, and 
continued to gain autonomy. "In the 1990's an integrated political and economic network of 
Islamist organizations had taken shape" (Moore, 2004, p. 143). Islamists social networks and 
banks allowed Islamists and the ICM to gain prominence in local cooperatives and national 
elections. "Salafist and Muslim brotherhood candidates controlled the majority of 
cooperatives and built secure, independent electoral and funding bases" (Moore, 2004, p. 
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143). Much of this funding base and institutional capacity came from the distribution of oil 
rent used to promote Islamists during the 1970's. Islamists controlled significant portions of 
the Kuwaiti market. After the Iraqi invasion, the Islamists movement had solidified itself as a 
politically salient organization enjoying autonomy from the state, with significant 
institutional capacity to negotiate with the state. 
The Islamic Constitutional Movement 
The ICM status as a proto-type party, with a distinct organizational identity separate 
from the Muslim Brotherhood movement, has allowed it to develop a clear set of electoral 
strategies (Brown, 2007, p. 8). The institutional capacity includes a set of governing 
structures. The ICM has a general assembly, a secretary general, a secretariat, a technical 
office, and an eight member political board. Islamists have a Parliamentary bloc, which is 
governed by the ICM's Parliamentary committee. The leadership is elected, and included 
more influence from bottom level members following disappointing performance in the 2003 
elections (Brown 2007). The ICM currently has six representatives in the national assembly, 
and has pushed candidates in all Kuwaiti elections since 1992. 
Brown notes that many of the ICM's leaders draw on experience from university 
student associations. Again, many of these leaders have benefited (directly or indirectly) 
from patronage and compulsory education. "To this day, the ICM leadership tends to draw on 
the middle class and professionals." (Brown, 2007, p. 7). It also has greater democratization 
as a clear objective. The ICM has an effective bloc in parliament it can rely on to push its 
agenda with the state, and has proven just as good at political maneuvering as business 
associations like the KCCI (Brown 2007). The ICM has also found influence in the tribal 
areas outside of urban Kuwait. Tetreault (1995) suggests this zone has traditionally been an 
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ally of the ruling family, who provides rent distribution through service candidates that act as 
part of the ruling family bloc in parliament. 
The ruling family has been good at playing opposition elements like the ICM against 
each other, and when opposition to the state grows strong, the emir dissolves parliament 
constitutionally and calls for new elections. Service candidates- those elected on the basis of 
their ability to obtain government benefits for their constituents- and ministers able to vote in 
parliament allowed the ruling family to deflect parliamentary ambitions to play a more 
aggressive legislative and oversight role. Only elected representatives can participate in votes 
of confidence of government ministers, and this confrontational step often leads to the 
dissolution of parliament and a call for new elections. The relative autonomy of opposition 
groups like the ICM and the KCCI has allowed parliament to recover when the emir 
dissolves parliament and continue to push for reforms. The Islamists are able to use the 
mosque as an important independent venue for mobilization of its social base and venting 
grievances with the state. This is similar to the function Diwaniyyas have played with 
business elites. 
The ICM led the charge in 2006 to push for electoral reforms. The reforms called for 
fairer districting. The government tried to avoid the issue, which led opposition groups in 
parliament to call for an interpolation of the prime minister, which led to dissolution of 
parliament. The Islamists were joined by leaders from liberalist and leftist groups (some 
business elites), and were supported more broadly by a pro democracy movement of Kuwaiti 
students. When new elections were held in 2006, a reform bloc (comprised of Islamists, 
business elites, populists, and leftists) won the majority (33 seats), and pushed through the 
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 Kuwait then consisted of 25 constituencies that elect 50 members to the national assembly. Opposition groups 
said this leads to vote buying in districts that can be swayed by a few hundred votes. Opposition groups called 
for only one district, and settled on five. 
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reforms. Jon Gourvette (2006) notes Islamists did best in that election, with three ICM 
members part of an 18 member Islamic bloc (p. 31). In addition, the various factions in the 
reform coalition worked as blocs to hammer out a common legislative agenda (Brown, 2007, 
p. 9). Islamists, based on their autonomy and agency, see democratic institutions as the best 
way to achieve the Islamization of Kuwait. 
Women and Modernization 
While it may be questionable to lump Kuwaiti women into a social group. Yet, doing so 
demonstrates one of the main tenets of the study's framework: the distribution of oil rent can 
inadvertently promote the rise of a social group by building human capital. These benefits 
have allowed women to become integral parts of the workforce, increase influence in 
Kuwaiti society, and gain political rights. 
The rentier framework suggests that socio-economic development- in the form of 
improved education and health services and substantial transfers of income and capital to the 
Kuwaiti population- contributed to citizen dependence on the state. These benefits also 
contributed to the formation of human capital that provided Kuwaitis from a broad spectrum 
of social groups with the resources to mobilize and challenge the emir's authority and to 
insist on guarantees of their civil rights (Tetreault, 2001, p. 204). 
While women were disenfranchised through the 20 century, they enjoyed social benefits 
like compulsory education. Tetreault (2001) sees a modernization effect28 in Kuwait that has 
brought women into the mainstream; women leave home for school and the workplace, and 
Diwaniyya bring non-family members into the domestic realm. Diwaniyyas were important 
venues for the business elites to vent frustrations with the Kuwaiti state, and women were 
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 This modernization effect is opposite of Ross's (2001) modernization effect, which suggests oil rent would 
limit the economic opportunities for women, and thus marginalized them economically and politically 
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often involved in this political discourse. These presented opportunities for Kuwaiti women. 
"Educational achievement as a result of compulsory education allows Kuwaiti women to 
challenge men on what men had long regarded as their grounds" (Tetreault, 2001, p. 210). 
Labor force participation is growing faster for women than for men. The National Kuwaiti 
banks reports working women tend to have higher educational attainment than male workers 
(Tetreault, 2001, p. 210). 
Women were also instrumental during the 1990 invasion. Tetreault notes that women 
were active in the pro-democracy movement immediately preceding the invasion, and 
continued to play an important role inside occupied Kuwait. Some were allowed to join the 
military and train in the U.S. alongside Kuwaiti men. Tetreault notes this activism during 
armed conflicts is usually correlated with an expansion of rights. This, along with increased 
human capital and labor force participation, allowed women to be seen as politically salient. 
Women's rising rates of public participations- as workers, members of many 
volunteer associations that form the bedrock of Kuwaiti civil society, and even as 
public figures whose opinions and activities are reported in the press- normalizes 
the idea that woman are autonomous agents and legitimate occupants of the 
public sphere (Tetreault, 2001, p. 211). 
According to Tetreault, working mothers have long been scapegoats in Kuwaiti 
society, and in politics. The governments gave women the right to vote and run for office in 
2005, even though the majority of elected deputies in the parliament (business, Islamists, 
leftists, populists) opposed the move in some form or other (Brown, 2007, p. 8). The Emir 
first proposed the step during the 1992 suspension of parliament, but the newly elected 
parliament voted it down. Since 1992, gender has been used as a smoke screen to divert 
popular and legislative attention away from the fierce struggles between the state and 
opposition over a host of other issues (Tetreault 2001, p. 213). When the Emir enfranchised 
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women completely in 2005, it was likely he was merely going back to the well to draw up 
what he believed to be the last social force available to strengthen his standing vis-a-vis the 
political opposition (Tetreault, 2001, p. 216). 
Women as a social group do not have the institutional capacity or legislative agenda 
of the Asil merchants or the Islamists. This means women as a social group cannot organize 
as effectively. In the 2006 elections, none of the 28 female candidates were elected to the 
national assembly. "Many female candidates did not run serious campaigns; they placed their 
name on the ballot form largely just to exercise a hard won right." (Gourvette, 2006, p. 31). 
Some of the female candidates demonstrate the modernization effect of oil rent. "Largely 
U.K. and U.S. educated members of wealthy families with connections into the Emiri and 
state institutions, these female candidates are far from the ordinary Kuwaiti experience- male 
or female." (Gourvette, 2006, p. 31). 
It is clear that women have become both productive Kuwaitis and political agents 
because of the ruling family and the state's distribution of oil rent. The enfranchisement of 
women demonstrates how the state and ruling family has contributed to what Tetreault 
considers a modernization effects. Oil rent builds human capital through education and other 
social services. This leads to more occupational specialization, and an increasingly 
professional population, which increasing includes women. This raises indicators of 
development like literacy, labor force participation, and GDP. 
Conclusion: Contingent Democrats? 
Early variations of the rentier framework did not account for the development of 
certain social groups in Kuwait both independent of oil rent and mobilized by the distribution 
of oil rent. Business elites have always had a relationship with the state, and oil rent allowed 
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this group to organize autonomous of the state, and play a genuine role in the formulation 
and implementation of economic policy. A business elite class developed in Kuwait from 
pearl traders long before the discovery of oil in 1938. Patronage ties and business success 
from oil-related commerce contributed the creation of institutional capacity and autonomy 
for Asil merchants and other merchants as time goes by. This autonomy means the private 
sector is less dependent on rentierism to be profitably, meaning that business elites may see 
democratic institutions as the best way to promote profitability. This lead the KCCI to 
support parliament, push for more influence on economic policy, and push for greater 
democratization when basic liberties are threatened. 
Islamists have benefited socially and politically from the distribution of oil rent. 
Islamists develop their institutional capacity from the mosque as a center of religious life in 
Kuwait, from the larger Brotherhood movement regionally and politically through the ICM's 
proto-party. This is due in part to oil rent distributed in the 1970's- through patronage to 
promote Islamists as opposition to leftist and business interests- as well as through the 
promotion of human capital like education and health services. These helped mobilized 
Islamists that became the opposition in the 1980's, and a political force in more recent years. 
The ICM has been at the forefront of pushing for greater parliamentary power in legislations, 
even in opposition of the state (Brown, 2007, p. 19). The ICM pushes for more power for the 
National Assembly and elected officials over the executive. 
The role of women in Kuwait politics and the economy demonstrates even more 
clearly that the distribution of rent can act as a catalyst for social formation. Compulsory 
education and work opportunities for women in Kuwait has given women a status enjoyed by 
few of their counterparts in the Gulf region. The need for technical professionals has brought 
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women into the labor force, the occupation secures their role as social agents of the greater 
good, and the rights of enfranchisement made women political actors in the Kuwaiti state. 
Whether or not women can build an institutional capacity to mobilize as an opposition group 
remains to be seen. What is evident is that, due in part to the distribution of oil rent; women 
have ascended from their traditional status in Kuwaiti society. Other marginalized groups-
the Shia minority, naturalized citizens, and Bedu tribal elements- have also become 
incorporated politically by the state to dilute opposition and keep its influence in parliament. 
The result may be that the ruling family is the last traditional force in Kuwait, one 




MOROCCO: DEPENDENT SOCIAL GROUPS IN A NON-RENTIER 
MONARCHY 
Politically Salient Groups and Authoritarianism 
This chapter will examine the degree of autonomy and agency achieved by social 
groups in non-rentier Morocco. Traditional literature suggests that Moroccan social groups 
may have less dependency on the monarchy due to lack of external rent. Yet social groups 
suffer through cycles of liberalization and then repression. Among the missing variables are 
the human and institutional capital created by the distribution of oil rent in Kuwait. Human 
capital like compulsory education and guaranteed employment for citizens are not enjoyed in 
Morocco. This can be enhanced during times of crisis. In times of crisis, civil and political 
rights are often sacrificed for the goal of economic development, leaving Moroccan social 
groups more dependent on the state and less mobilized. In Kuwait, social groups often 
mobilized during times of crisis, notably the fiscal crisis of the 1980's. 
One social group examined will be business elites. Business elites were integral in the 
Moroccan independence movement, and benefited from French to Moroccan business 
transfers in the 1960's or 1970's. 
The second social group examined will be Islamists, who are very involved in formal 
parliamentary politics. Cavatorta (2005) suggests Islamists stand as the only real opposition 
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in the Moroccan parliament. Mainstream Islamists have been hindered by the backlash from 
clandestine radical Islamists. Cohen and Jaidi note that many Moroccans (especially women) 
are disillusioned by formal politics, and instead mobilize through cultural-political 
organizations. 
The third group examined will be women in the context of larger cultural movements. 
Moroccan women collectively organize more than their Kuwaiti counterparts. Women's 
organizations and other cultural-political movements in Morocco add a dynamic to 
opposition in Morocco not present in Kuwait. 
Traditional literature suggests that these groups are less dependent on the state than 
their counterparts in an oil rentier state. Morocco has no natural resource wealth, an economy 
dependent largely on agriculture and opened by market reform. Business elites have a fairly 
open market following economic liberalization of the 1980's and 1990's. Morocco has 
always allowed political parties which are outlawed in Kuwait. An alternation of power was 
decreed by King Hassan II, and an opposition government was established in 1997. This may 
suggest that social groups have some degree of autonomy and agency to bargain effectively 
with the state. 
Despite the success of these liberalizations, it hasn't made these social groups less 
dependent on the state, with most political power consolidated behind the sovereign. 
Morocco follows a similar pattern to other monarchies in region, whereby small political 
liberalization is followed by a consolidation of power by the ruling family soon after. Most 
reforms are dictated by the King, and Cohen and Jaidi (2005) note that formal politics does 
not enjoy the support of the majority of Moroccans. 
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Creation of a Repressive Monarchy 
French policy in pre-independent Morocco was one of benign neglect: 
underdevelopment, high illiteracy, poverty, and poor health conditions. After independence 
in 1956, the monarch under Mohammed V fought for control of the state with leaders of the 
independence movement in the Istiqlal party. While a portion of the general population was 
behind the Istiqlal leaders, the King had support from traditional elites, some business elites, 
the military, and Islamists. Here we see a similar trajectory as the Kuwaiti state, strong 
business-state relations and support from traditional elites. The King's allies were able to 
create a cross-class coalition that the King could identify with. This added to the legitimacy 
of the monarchy the Istiqlal couldn't reproduce. The opposition ran the government for the 
first few years after independence, proving to be very ineffective. King Hassan II assumed 
the throne in the early 1960's. "With the acquiescence of nationalist parties, the sultan, now a 
modern King, emerged as a symbol of national liberation, and became, constitutionally, the 
supreme arbitrator, guarantor, and legislator of political legitimacy." (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 
12). These early experiences give some legitimacy to political parties and opposition groups, 
again suggesting Morocco's experience should be more advanced than the Kuwaiti case. 
King Hassan II established an authoritarian monarchy that exists for over two decades. 
Power was increasingly concentrated around the King and supported by traditional elites and 
business elites who were against the leftist government in power following independence. 
The reign of Hassan II was one of state-run development and widespread repression. "King 
Hassan's insecurity about his opponents led him to establish a regime of little tolerance, one 
in which opponents were jailed, exiled, or killed." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 51). Hassan IPs 
personalization of power was replicated in the public sector and economy. The growing 
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capitalist class continued to function through patrimony and patronage, and many party 
leaders were effectively co-opted by the monarchy, or marginalized through repressive 
measures29. Social groups had little influence over state policies and were ineffective at 
bargaining with the state. 
Fiscal Crisis and Political Mobilization 
Unlike Kuwait, Morocco is absent of vast natural resources, with an economy based 
on a large agricultural sector. Scholars expected this economy to favor some sort of a market 
democracy (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 556). The Moroccan economy fared well during the 1960's 
and 1970's. Like Kuwait, political liberalization began in Morocco in the 1980's amidst a 
worldwide economic crisis. 
The economic crisis of the 1980's came at a time when Morocco had high external 
debt, high unemployment, and population growth that was outpacing economic growth. 
"Repressive states may earn a degree of legitimacy of they can provide near-total 
employment for all its citizens. When unemployment increases, however, the state must 
either democratize or be prepared for confrontation." (Burton-Rose, 1998, p. 10). Morocco 
became the first North African country to enter into the IMF's structural adjustment program. 
With it came market liberalization, and the beginning of political liberalization and opening 
of independent political space for social groups in Morocco. 
Dependent Capitalists: Patronage, and Loyalty 
Pre-Independence Merchants 
Similar to Kuwait, there is a business-state relationship in Morocco. Merchants flourished 
for centuries in Morocco before colonialism. Shortly after Morocco fell under French 
29
 The best example of this is widespread crackdowns following two failed coups in the 1970's. This can also be 
seen with the clandestine Islamists factions. 
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colonial rule in 1907, traders in the city of Fez became capitalists, and a nascent bourgeois 
grew independent of colonial capital (Clement, 1986, p. 13). Similar to the Asil merchants in 
Kuwait, the merchants from Fez gain capital during the two World Wars. Following WWII, 
the economic center shifted to the coast and the enterprising Fez capitalists move to 
Casablanca and become known as Fassis. These Fassi merchants were instrumental in the 
Istiqlal independence movement.30 The Istiqlal party struggled with the monarch for power 
following independence, eventually losing out to the authoritarianism of Hassan II. 
Lots of parallels can be seen between Kuwaiti and Moroccan business elites. There is a 
strong pre-independence business-state relationship in both cases. Moroccan merchants were 
instrumental in the independence movement and party, suggesting they had some political 
agency from which to expand on. In contrast to Kuwait, despite business elite involvement in 
Moroccan politics early on, the dependence of this social group on the monarchy soon 
became evident. 
Dependent Capitalists 
The Fassi merchants have gained capital due to a large degree of dependence on the 
monarchy. Morocco began a process called 'Moroccanization' in the 1973, aimed at speeding 
the transfer of formerly French businesses to Moroccans32. Moroccan entrepreneurs sprung 
up in multiple sectors, buying businesses from departing Europeans . A whole new stratum 
of Moroccan society was created by this windfall (Clemet, 1986, p. 14). The Moroccan state, 
through state-run development and social welfare policies, created a middle class. Murphy 
30
 Businessman Muhammad Laghzaoui, son of a Fez merchant, was instrumental in the Istiqlal party (the 
independence party), which was headed by Allal al-Fassi, who was from a leading Fez merchant family. 
31
 Members of the Isiqlal party did run the country for the first few years. 
32
 This process involved 1500 companies and over 400,000 hectares of farmland 
3j
 These included small and medium size businesses, like garages, restaurants, small brokering firms, and 
insurance companies. 
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notes that the holdings of the sovereign made the process of Morocanization harder. "Matters 
were complicated by the massive holdings of the King himself, reportedly the largest 
landowner, holding controlling interest in Morocco's largest holding company, and enjoying 
substantial assets in the commercial and banking sector. As in all truly patrimonial societies, 
it became hard to tell where the state purse's ended and the ruler's began." (Murphy, 2001, p. 
21). These financial linkages made capitalists dependent on the state for financing and 
protected market position. 
Since independence, the state protected the private sector by regulating trade and 
domestic production and built a middle class through expansion of the public administration 
and education (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 31). The state took over most of the heavy industry 
left by the departing French, and found it hard to get Moroccan investors to take their place 
(Clement, 1986, p. 15). Despite trying to promote a larger private sector, the success was 
overshadowed by the public sector's involvements in economic activity. "The enlarged 
public sector and subsidized private sector served as a way of containing the aspirations of 
political figures, of satisfying popular demand, and of reinforcing consensus around the 
legitimacy of the monarchy." (Murphy, 2001, p. 22). 
Business elites were loyal to the monarchy and at first were rewarded for their loyalty. 
Early ministerial positions often went to wealthy merchants. For the first 15 years after 
independence, the Fassis held a commanding position among Morocco's bourgeois (Clement, 
1986, p. 15). Other social groups saw this as an abuse of wealth and power, a position that 
the monarchy used to stifle the aspirations of Fassi political leaders. 
The Moroccan government promoted other groups to offset the influence of Fassi 
merchants, which enjoyed a powerful network of connections, money, and patronage 
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(Clement, 1986, p. 15). Similar to the Kuwaiti monarchy in the 1970's, the Moroccan state 
aimed at keeping any opposition weak. After two failed coups in the early 1970's, the regime 
used growth to invest in a loyal middle class that equated its interest with state legitimacy 
(Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 36). At the same time large segments of the population, especially 
the rural poor, did not benefit from social policy. Moroccanization also helped the monarchy 
diversify the bourgeois, promoting other groups like Soussi merchant.34 
Moroccan capitalists do enjoy venues for bargaining with the state similar to those in 
Kuwait. Business elites have developed an institutional capacity through chambers of 
commerce. The Federation of Moroccan Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Services is a 
national association gathering 28 national trade, industry and services chambers. Created in 
1962, the Federation's 868 members are elected by the tradesmen, industrialists and service 
providers. The Federation represents the many chambers both nationally and internationally. 
At the national level, the Federation is represented in the appointed upper house of 
parliament by 24 members and takes part in work of several boards of directors of public 
organizations and decision-making centers. The upper house is mainly comprised of 
supporters of the sovereign. Their inclusion in state affairs is often seen as an effort to co-opt 
leadership. 
The Federation, chambers of commerce, and trade unions give the private sector more 
access to the state, but not necessarily the ability to bargain more effectively with the state. 
There is some disconnect between the business elites that operate through patronage and 
loyalty to the state and those looking to integrate into an open global market. 
The Soussi's would eventually intermarry with the Fassi aristocracy, increasing the base of the business 
elites (Clement, 1988) 
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"The private sector, meanwhile, becomes fragmented between the old firms that 
seek to advance their interests through gradual internal reforms and proximity to 
the state, and those new firms which seek to take advantage of the larger 
economic space available to them and which adopt the new culture of business 
and entrepreneurships." (Murphy, 2001, p. 26). 
Most business elites remain dependent on the state. Corruption and patronage are still 
seen as rampant in business-state relations. Business is often reliant on a Moroccan state 
many times wealthier than the wealthiest capitalists. Clement (1986) argues that the vastness 
of the royal fortune, the patronage network of the monarchy structure, as well as the 
centralized nature of the state make for dependence by capitalists on the state. "From time to 
time there are murmurs of discontent and muffled criticism of royal absolutism, but 
Moroccan capitalists seem little inclined to rebel against their major business partner and 
main political guarantor" (Clement, 1986, p. 17). Murphy (2001) notes that market 
liberalization has enhanced the role of the private sector in Morocco, but has also maintained 
networks of state and royal patronage, as well as working to benefits the King's economic 
holdings (Murphy, 2001, p. 26). 
Capitalists in Morocco have made strides to increase their own holdings and capital. This 
has, in turn, created a middle class that seeks more political options. Business elites have 
developed venues, like the Business Federation, to bargain more effectively with the state. 
This has not increased the ability of the capitalists to prevent to consolidation of power by the 
monarchy. Capitalists that do act as political agents typically support the sovereign in a 
parliament that enjoys little popular support. 
Dependent Islamists: Radical Islam, the PJD, and Co-opting Leaders 
Islamic factions have become political salient actors in many MENA countries, and 
Morocco is no exception. Islamist groups were active in the Moroccan independence 
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movement, and exist today as one of the few social groups with an institutional capacity 
independent of state resources. The Islamists opposition in Morocco is more diverse than the 
Islamists opposition in Kuwait. While the Islamists have deep historical roots in Morocco 
extending back to the independence movement, Islamists factions didn't gain popular support 
until the economic crisis of the 1980's. 
Morocco's poor socio-economic conditions gave rise to strong Islamists movements. 
Both the King and secular opposition parties were afraid of their emergence and adopted 
authoritarian measures to deal with them (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 560). Poor economic 
conditions of the 1980's and 1990's and the disenchantment with formal politics by much of 
Morocco's underclass were rallying cries for Islamists. "The alienated from formal politics 
provoked Islamist political leaders, who view widespread disenchantment with conventional 
politics as fodder for mobilization, and attraction to aesthetics and behavior promoted 
through the global market as justification for an Islamists regime." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 
55). 
Given that the Moroccan state does not have the oil rent to placate groups like the 
Islamists factions, and that economic crises over the past few decades dictated small degrees 
of liberalization, it is natural to assume that the Islamists in Morocco should be able to push 
for reforms similar to the ICM in Kuwait. Herb sees the Islamists as the only true opposition 
part in Moroccan parliament (p. 182). Two factors prevented the Islamists opposition from 
copying the success of the ICM; the existence of radical Islam, and the co-opting of Islamists 
legally recognized by state politics. 
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Radical Islam 
One factor is the radical and clandestine Islamists. There are three forms of Islamist 
opposition in Morocco. First is the legally recognized Party for Justice and Development. "It 
is allowed to participate because it is a party able to compromise with the regime and can be 
co-opted." (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 561). Brown (2007) notes the PJD has followed a similar path 
as other electoral movements in the Arab world, like the ICM in Kuwait, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and Hamas in Palestine (Brown, 2007, p. 10). 
Second, there is the Charity and Justice Association founded by dissident Sheik Abd 
al-Salam Yassine. Cavatorta considers this group barely tolerated by the state, but very 
popular with Morocco's large underclass. This group is concerned with islamization of 
society from the bottom, while often engaging in political discourse critical of the state. 
Third is the clandestine Salafist Jihad; a radical group often in direct opposition to the 
state. The Salafists are said to have funding and organizational ties to al-Qaeda, and many 
trained during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Radical Islam has often been used 
by the state as justification for repressive measures against Islamists. Morocco only had to 
look to its neighbors to understand the danger of radical Islam. War between military and 
Islamists in Algeria worried Morocco about its own Islamists (Sweet, 2002, p. 22). 
These radical elements marginalized the PJD's influence over the King and the state. 
The Casablanca bombings in 2003 and the greater war on terror further marginalize Islamist 
groups. The war on terror allows the King to repress Islamists with little cost to the state's 
legitimacy. "Since the events of 9/11 the 'war on terror' has helped Morocco to justify its 
repressive and authoritarian policies with the blessings of the U.S. government, which has 
now signed a free-trade agreement which does not include a conditionality clauses referring 
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to political reforms." (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 562). Radical Islam hurts not only the agency and 
influence of mainstream Islamists groups like the PJD, but justifies repression of political and 
social rights for Moroccans in general. Cohen and Jaidi note the most apparent contradiction 
in Morocco is that between radicalism and democratization (p. 3). 
Dependent Islamists 
Another factor is the ability of the monarch to co-opt Islamists leaders into the 
government. The PJD often acquiesces to state demands. Cavatorta gives the example of a 
2003 decision not to run candidates in all constituencies in fear of embarrassing the king by 
achieving a significant Islamic political victory (p. 561). This is where a parallel between 
Islamists movements in Kuwait and Morocco can be seen. When civil liberties were 
suspended in 1976, Islamists in Kuwait acquiesced to the decision of the sovereign. Islamists 
in Moroccan formal politics have been acquiescent to the state in a similar fashion. 
Cohen and Jaidi suggest the PJD stands behind the monarchy system because it was 
chosen by the Moroccan people. Most members of the PJD come from middle income or 
lower income families living in working-class or traditional areas of large cities. These 
leaders are often co-opted by the government, and often acquiesce to state decisions on 
reforms. When there were proposed reforms to the family law in 1992, the PJD mobilized 
against the reforms . The PJD believed any problems within the family code should be 
handled by a reaffirmation to Islamic principles. The PJD eventually supported the reform, in 
part because after the terrorist attack in 2003 the political climate favored reform over 
Islamists arguments, and because women had the support of the King and international 
organizations like the World Bank (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 90). 
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 For the PJD, it was not the family code that necessarily required reform, but rather that Muslims should 
improve their education about the position of women in Islam. 
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Cooptation of formal political factions in the Islamists movement by the state, the 
disenchantment with formal politics in general and radicalized Islam have limited the ability 
of Islamists to be agents for democratization. Islamists in the PJD and other organization 
enjoy more autonomy and institutional capacity than any other Moroccan social group. Yet 
they are largely ineffective in influencing policy, or pushing an electoral agenda. Islamists 
cannot challenge the executive without broader support, and more autonomy from state 
influence. 
Cultural-Political Organizations and Women 
Despite an opening of political space in Morocco since the 1980's, few social groups 
have been able to mobilize the masses in support of further liberalization. This is due in part 
to disenchantment with party politics among large segments of Morocco's population. Cohen 
and Jaidi (2006) note that cultural-political movements have partly filled that void. "Whereas 
elites engage in a self-enclosed discourse of political transformation through moderation, and 
cultural-political movements instigate debate and influence legislation, the majority of the 
country either shows little interest in politics or declines to participate formally." (Cohen and 
Jaidi, 2006, p. 67). 
Cultural-political movements are movements led by Moroccan social groups to improve 
the social and political conditions of Morocco. These movements can put pressure on parties 
in government. "Unlike the leftist movements of the 60's and 70's that concentrated on 
economic disparity, the new movement championing particular cultural behaviors and values, 
cultural-political movements have obtained enough popular support to compete with the state 
for influence." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 54). These groups started to emerge during the 
decline of repressive measures by the Moroccan state staring in the 1980's. The rise of these 
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associations has paralleled the fall of party politics' credibility (Burton-Rose, 1998, p.9). 
While these groups are able to reach and mobilize larger segments of the population that 
parties like the PJD or the USFP, Cohen and Jaidi note their rhetoric avoids political 
discourse. Mobilization wise, these movements have eclipsed the popularity of many formal 
parties, as well as the traditional leftist opposition. "Unlike their predecessors, contemporary 
cultural-political movements have reached large sections of the population" (Cohen and Jaidi, 
2006, p. 85). 
Through these groups may not commonly engage in political discourse, their existence in 
independent political space in Moroccan society has political implications. "Their presence 
has meant that political liberalization has become a process of negotiation, not victory for 
one party or another or unilateral imposition of reforms." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 76). 
Contemporary cultural-political movements include Berber associations , unemployed 
college graduates , and women's organizations. These cultural-political associations allow 
Moroccans to have more political choices, but are largely ineffective in dealing with the state 
because they lack an independent institutional capacity that can effectively bargain with the 
state. They can push for specific policies and interests- family law reform, legalizing Berber 
languages, etc. Most of these associations are funded by the state. Only Islamists are truly 
financially independent of the state. "Unlike women's organizations, Islamists can claim a 
moral advantage because of their distance from the state. They organize their own funding 
and manage their own resources. They utilize these resources to demonstrate their efficiency 
and their connection with the people." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2005, p. 106). These organizations, 
aimed at increasing autonomy for Amazigh culture and language 
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 Aimed at securing employment for its members. Employment is a guaranteed right in the Moroccan 
constitution 
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similar to other social groups in Morocco, cannot constrain the will of the sovereign, nor 
check the executive. 
Women's Associations 
The role of women's associations in Moroccan politics creates an interesting contrast to 
the role of women in Kuwaiti politics. Women in Morocco form women's associations 
funded in part by the state. Similar to the Amazigh associations, the women's associations 
often avoid political discourse, and focus on women's rights and other social issues. 
"Women's organizations offer services that protect women before the law and elevate their 
social and economic independence as individuals." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2005, p. 105) Women's 
associations provide social services that enforce equality before the law and within the family. 
The social issues are where we can see the contrast between the creation of human capital 
due to the distribution of oil rent, and the lack of comparable human capital among the 
women of Morocco. The women of Kuwait have benefited from compulsory education; the 
women of Morocco have suffered high illiteracy rates, lack of education, and lack of job 
opportunities. Women's associations target some of these social problems. 
Similar to Kuwait, women have enjoyed greater inclusion in formal politics due in part to 
reforms of the monarchy, not an elected parliament. Women's rights gained a priority under 
current King Mohammed VI. Women gained high government appointments and 30 seats in 
parliament. Women's associations were instrumental in pushing for a reform of the 
Moudawanna, or family code. The family code was drawn up after independence in 1956 
from Islamic law38. In 1992, reform of the Moudawanna was proposed to give wives more 
influence over their marriages. Women's associations mobilize to support the reform, 
whereas Islamists mobilize against it. Both movements led grassroots awareness campaigns. 
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 The code views the primary purpose of marriage as procreation 
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Women's associations created an umbrella organization to lobby the monarchy and 
eventually won out. This effort had lasting ramifications for the agency of social groups like 
women. "The effort of women's organizations to change the family code contributed to a 
larger ambition, driven by international and local NGO's, to create and enforce a system of 
modern rights." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 92). 
Women's associations were somewhat successful in lobbying the state for specific policy 
reform, not necessarily greater political and economic inclusion. This is where the greatest 
contrast with oil-dependent states comes in to play. Women in Morocco do have the ability to 
mobilize, vote, run for office, and can pressure the state for reform (as was the case with the 
family law reforms). Women's organizations in Morocco do not enjoy the human capital of 
their Kuwaiti counterparts, who enjoy compulsory education, and higher labor force 
participation. Kuwait's small population favors the state investing in the human capital of 
women to add to their professional labor force, whereas Morocco suffers high rates of 
unemployment compounded by population growth. 
Women in Morocco can only achieve limited mobilization toward more political 
inclusion without increased human capital. These associations remain dependent on the state 
for both legal status and financing, so they fear of 'biting the hand that feeds you' hinders 
women's associations from seeing a transition to greater democratization as benefiting their 
socio-economic interests. 
Conclusion: Dependent Democrats and the "Alternance" 
Morocco has made strides toward political liberalization and reform, due in part to social 
groups, but these successes have been largely incomplete. Political and economic reforms 
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have succeeded primarily through the initiative of the King, responding in part to the demand 
of the population following economic crises. Morocco stands out among the existing Arab 
monarchies for the prevalence of fraud in its elections (Herb, 2005, p. 171). While civil 
liberties have expanded, political rights have lagged behind. Efforts to liberalize have 
effectively solidified the monarchy's legitimacy as first among institutions. Mohammed VI 
has taken no steps to delegate any executive power to elected officials, and the opposition 
government has inherited failing social services, and a new legislature that increases the 
amount of appointed (and assumed loyal to the throne) officials. Social groups have made 
gains, but have not achieved the autonomy to constrain the monarchy and push for greater 
inclusion into policy and reform. 
The story of Morocco's incomplete democratization can be told in the political reforms of 
the 1990's. Kuwait underwent many political changes following the 1991 Gulf War, as did 
Morocco. The Moroccan economy experiences another downturn in the 1990's, brought on 
by drought conditions that severely affected its large agriculture sector. This led to a rural 
exodus and high urban unemployment. In the early 1990s, faced with budgetary constraints, 
weak economic growth, and growing social unrest, King Hassan II undertook limited 
measures of political liberalization. Limited resources meant that patronage could not 
function as before. Hassan II proposes an alternance, or alternation in power, in 1993. This 
was passed off as a move toward democratization. By inviting opposition groups into power, 
one of the key principles of liberal democracy, the rotation of political power between groups 
through elections, had been applied (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 556). The original Alternance was 
based on the then-unicameral legislature in which two thirds of representatives were elected, 
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and one third was appointed. This would force the Koutla opposition to align with a center 
right pro-monarchy party to establish an opposition government. This was rejected by the 
opposition. The opposition also objected to the Monarchy choosing key ministers and 
suggested the 1993 elections were rife with irregularities and manipulation. 
In 1997, the Koutla opposition government was elected, and Hassan II establishes a new 
alternance initiative by nominating a leftist prime minister and giving parliament some real 
power (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 556). Cavatorta (2005) suggests a lack of interest in real 
democratization on the part of international actors meant secular parties were forced into 
accepting the alternance offered by Hassan II, if they wanted any say at all in running the 
country (p. 560). Maghraoui (2001) notes that the reform occurred by order of the King and 
not through free and transparent legislative elections (p. 15). 
The opposition government seemed as doomed to fail as the original opposition 
government following independence. "Moreover, when in 1997, the opposition government 
led by the USFP, came to office, it assumed the obligation of managing the social problems 
engendered by budgetary cuts and weak economic growth." (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006, p. 42). 
The opposition government was saddled with failure of social services and high 
unemployment and the opposition's limited mandate paralyzed the new government and 
reinforces the throne (Sweet, 2001, p. 23). 
A new bicameral legislature was established in 199740. It was confirmed by the Moroccan 
people in a referendum vote. The reform reinforced conservative bias loyal to the monarch 
while increasing participation at a national level. It effectively co-opted the opposition into 
the government without giving that opposition more influence over the prerogative of the 
39
 The Koutla is an opposition government comprised of the USFP and thWIstiqlal party 
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 with the upper house being appointed by municipal councils, union representatives and business council, and 
the lower house being elected by popular vote 
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sovereign. While the altemance proposed in 1993 required the opposition to deal with 1/3 of 
representatives being indirectly chosen, the 1997 Altemance meant the opposition had to deal 
with a whole house indirectly chosen. The monarchy still chose important ministers. "King 
Hassan's bold embrace of the altemance now appears to have been a cleverly calculated 
maneuver." (Sweet, 2001, p. 25). 
While it can be argued that Morocco's opposition government is part of a transition to 
democratization, it is often seen as failed democratization. Despite the length of the process, 
democratization failed to take hold and the past few years have seen a return to 
authoritarianism (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 556). The opposition government has yet to deliver on 
significant reforms. "There has been no constitutional reform, no new penal code, civil code, 
electoral code, labor law, or bill of rights." (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 15). There is little support 
for formal politics, contributing to the notion social groups cannot effectively constrain the 
sovereign. 
Herb suggests that the altemance allowed the King to co-opt political leaders as much as 
it turned power over to them. The King still wields many powers directly. Social group 
cannot effectively bargain with the state. This is due in part to a lack of institutional 
autonomy and political agency. Social groups can make limited gains, particularly during 
times of crisis. But they cannot dictate policy, political discourse, or other affairs of state. In 
Morocco, political discourse is still dictated primarily by the King. In contrast electoral 
reforms and general discourse in Kuwait show social groups can lobby the state for reforms 
and further democratization. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Oil has not been widely viewed as a gift, but it should not be categorized as a curse. The 
rentier framework suggests oil is a curse to democratization and development in late 
developing countries. Oil rent limits the choices available to political actors, and breaks the 
linkages between the ruler and the ruled. Social groups in Kuwait demonstrate those 
arguments are no longer tenable in all cases. Oil rent also had positive effects on social 
groups in Kuwait, allowing them to build capital, institutional capacity, and autonomy. With 
the historical presence independent of oil, business elites and Islamists have become 
politically salient. Their autonomy can be seen in their institutional capacity, and ability to 
bargain with the state. Business may focus on economic policy, and Islamists may focus on 
electoral reform, but both view strengthening democratic institutions (i.e. parliament and 
elected office) as the best means to achieving their material interests. These social groups 
have been promoted by oil rent; become active political agents, and driven government 
reform while increasing the power of parliament. Oil rent increased the human capital of 
each group in the study, with women gaining economic and political inclusion. This finding 
is contrary to traditional rentier analysis. 
This can be seen in contrast to the Morocco case. The inclusion in this study is 
important to show that certain Kuwaiti social groups have proved more autonomous than 
their Moroccan counterparts, though not uniformly. Social groups in Morocco do enjoy some 
agency, but few are autonomous from the state and able to constrain or challenge the 
monarchy. Reforms are the prerogative of the King, and periods of liberalization are 
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followed by a consolidation of power behind the sovereign and a retraction of civil liberties. 
The dependency of Moroccan social groups lies in the inability to effectively check the 
power of the executive. Political parties have little mass support, the parliament has a large 
pro-sovereign bias, and cultural-political movements have proven largely ineffective. 
Business is caught between traditional patronage, loyalty networks, and global market 
liberalization. Islamists suffer from repression due to radical Islamists, and co-opting of 
leaders by the monarchy. While Kuwaiti social groups helped push electoral reform, despite 
the emir dissolving parliament, the Alternance in Morocco demonstrates social groups there 
still have to acquiesce if they want any say in how Morocco is run. 
Does oil hinder democracy? It depends on which state is analyzed. Oil rent has been 
shown to benefit social groups and help them push for greater democratization in Kuwait. 
Yet other GCC states have relatively closed political systems. The constitutions of other 
states like Bahrain and Qatar severely limit the power of their parliaments, and do not allow 
political parties. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter in the region and remains an 
absolutist state with no elections. If oil promotes the political agency of certain social groups, 
we might see it in other states. If not, then oil might not be the only factor increasing the 
autonomy and agency of social groups. 
This is where Bellin and Okruhlik stress the historical context of a state. The history of a 
rentier state and its social groups must factor into the discussion. Similar comparative studies 
concerning other MENA oil rentier states and their social groups are warranted. The relative 
small size of Kuwait may warrant a similar study on a larger rentier, or a similar sized Gulf 
rentier to see if population size or labor base are factors as well. Other social groups not 
mentioned in this study also warrant further investigation. University students have proved 
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politically salient in both Kuwait and Morocco and often clash with Islamists factions. 
Though Kuwait does not have a large military, this group may be important politically to 
larger rentier states and warrants further investigations. 
Rentier states should be compared to similar states in a given region to see the effects on 
democratization. While many oil reserves and exporters are in the Middle East, major 
exporters can be found in other regions with their own unique social structures. Among them 
are Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and others. These warrant similar comparative 
analysis. 
The case of Kuwait carries ramifications for the rentier framework and may reaffirm the 
analysis of Bellin, Moore, and Lipset. Rentier states may democratize, and social forces may 
be the agents for the democratization. Oil rent builds human capital and can contribute to the 
institutional capacity and autonomy of social groups. Bellin's model suggests this make it 
more likely these groups will champion democratic institutions. The case of Kuwait validates 
Moore's belief that capitalists are class agent for democracy. It also shows that wealth 
generated from oil can lead to development which, according to the Lipset thesis, is 
positively correlated with democracy. 
In many late developing regions in the world, the path to democracy takes a different 
route than it did in Western Europe, the birthplace of state formation and democratic 
consolidation. Bellin's analysis suggests as much. The path to democracy in authoritarian 
regions like MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, and others will be found in the historical and social 
roots of the regions, despite the structural effects of intervening variables like globalization, 
oil wealth, or Western influence. An organic approach can be seen in Kuwait, where social 
forces (capitalists, Islamists, and women) have turned the structural effects of oil on its head, 
67 
and are willing to compete with the monarchy for political power. While there are definitive 
impediments to democratization in the Middle East, oil cannot be categorically assigned as 
an impediment. In fact it may be an inadvertent gift to social groups in Kuwait. 
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